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1.
Non-stupidity condition and pragmatics in artificial intelligence
Bojan Borstner, Niko Šetar, 2022, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP) (Harnad 1990) is commonly considered one of the central challenges in the philosophy of artificial intelligence as its resolution is deemed necessary for bridging the gap between simple data processing and understanding of meaning and language. SGP has been addressed on numerous occasions with varying results, all resolution attempts having been severely, but for the most part justifiably, restricted by the Zero Semantic Commitment Condition (Taddeo and Floridi 2005). A further condition that demands explanatory power in terms of machine-to-human communication is the Non-Stupidity Condition (Bringsjord 2013) that demands an SG approach to be able to account for plausibility of higher-level language use and understanding, such as pragmatics. In this article, we undertake the endeavour of attempting to explain how merging certain early requirements for SG, such as embodiment, environmental interaction (Ziemke 1998), and compliance with the Z-Condition with symbol emergence (Sun 2000; Tangiuchi et al. 2016, etc.) rather than direct attempts at symbol grounding can help emulate human language acquisition (Vogt 2004; Cowley 2007). Along with the presumption that mind and language are both symbolic (Fodor 1980) and computational (Chomsky 2017), we argue that some rather abstract aspects of language can be logically formalised and finally, that this melange of approaches can yield the explanatory power necessary to satisfy the Non-Stupidity Condition without breaking any previous conditions.
Ključne besede: artificial intelligence, symbol arguing, pragmatics, language, computationalism
Objavljeno v DKUM: 18.08.2023; Ogledov: 202; Prenosov: 25
.pdf Celotno besedilo (133,36 KB)
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2.
A monosemic account of modality in speech act theory
Niko Šetar, 2020, magistrsko delo

Opis: Connection between modality in the English language and pragmatics is a matter of extensive debate as it often seems there is no concrete way of establishing a sensible correlation between modality that an utterance contains and its pragmatic function, which is due to numerous issues pertaining to different accounts of both modality and speech act theory. Traditional view of modality splits modal verbs into three categories: epistemic, deontic and dynamic (also known as simple root modality). The problem with this view is that there is no way of determining whether a certain modal verb is used in epistemic, deontic, or dynamic sense as most modals can serve any of the three functions, therefore explaining modality within this framework is highly ambiguous even when relying on broader context of the utterance containing a certain modal. Traditional view of speech acts, on the other hand, divides them into locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. Yet it would seem that all modalities pertain only to illocutionary speech acts, as they are the ones that express speaker's intentions, which are most heavily influenced by modality. The connection between traditionalist accounts is therefore quite impossible. A more contemporary view splits speech acts into assertive, commissive, constative, directive and imperative speech acts, while we may consider locution, illocution and perlocution to be aspects of these speech acts, rather than separate categories. In these case, different modalities may be connected to different speech acts, but the ambiguity that traditional view of modality contains persists into any attempt to draw the connection between modality and speech act. Therefore, an alternative account of modality is required. Two well-known such accounts are polysemic and monosemic views of modality. Polysemic views claim that every lexeme (in our case, a modal verb) may possess several semantic meanings, while monosemic views maintain that every lexeme can be defined in the sense of a single meaning. Reviewing polysemic accounts shows that their reliance on multiple meanings and definitions for every lexeme leads to similar ambiguities as the traditional view of modality, and can therefore not be used in our efforts. Monosemic views, however, differ greatly from one another. While some accounts have been shown to be inadequate, Groefsema’s 1995 account serves the required purpose. The author defines each modal verb in the sense of the proposition expressed by the modal and an additional minimal set of propositions that supports the use of that particular modal. Kissine (2013) similarly defines speech acts, thus a correlation between modal verbs and speech acts may be established. Finally, we attempt to show that each modal verb with a particular minimal set of supporting propositions can only feature in one type of speech act, thus also defining the speech act within which it is contained.
Ključne besede: Pragmatics, modality, speech acts, epistemic, deontic, dynamic, assertives, commissives, constatives, directives, imperatives, polysemy, monosemy
Objavljeno v DKUM: 16.09.2020; Ogledov: 979; Prenosov: 92
.pdf Celotno besedilo (355,48 KB)

3.
Utemeljevanje simbolov in pragmatika v umetni inteligenci
Niko Šetar, 2020, magistrsko delo

Opis: Problem utemeljevanja simbolov se prvič pojavi leta 1990, njegova osnovna formulacija pa temelji na starejšem miselnem eksperimentu imenovanem kitajska soba. Slednji govori o tem, da lahko nek inteligentni akter obravnava nepoznane simbole na podlagi prepoznave vzorcev, brez da bi razumel pomen simbolov, ki jih obravnava, ali pomen rezultatov njegovih operacij s simboli. Za razumevanje tega, kar počne, bi moral biti zmožen te simbole utemeljiti, se pravi povezati abstraktni simbol z referentom, ki ga ta simbol predstavlja. Prvotni poskusi reševanja tega problema so se osredotočali predvsem na tako imenovane reprezentacionalistične pristope, ki poskušajo utemeljiti simbole v predstavah, ki jih ti simboli v akterju sprožijo na podlagi zaznav in izkušenj akterja. Kmalu se je pokazalo, da reprezentacija ni nujna za utemeljevanje, medtem ko je smiselno obdržati zaznave in izkušnje kot osnovo za utemeljevanje simbolov s konkretnimi, zaznavno dostopnimi referenti. Dodatni, univerzalno sprejet pogoj je tudi, da mora biti umetni akter, ki želi doseči tovrstno utemeljevanje utelešen, saj mu to omogoča interakcijo z okoljem. V letu 2005 avtorja Taddeo in Floridi izdata prelomen članek, v katerem izpostavita, da mora uspešen pristop k utemeljevanju zadostiti pogoju, ki zahteva, da umetni akter ob začetku postopka utemeljevanja simbolov ne sme vsebovati nikakršnih semantičnih virov, lahko pa vsebuje orodja, ki mu pomagajo pri razvoju semantike skozi utemeljevanje. Kasneje Bringsjord (2014) predstavi pogoj, da mora vsak teoretični poskus utemeljevanja simbolov voditi v akterjevo zmožnost razumevanja in sodelovanja v naravni komunikaciji, kar predpostavlja razumevanje pragmatike in ostalih jezikovnih sredstev višjega reda. Ob sprejetju teh pogojev lahko poskusimo orisati koherenten teoretični mehanizem za vzpostavitev utemeljevanja simbolov v umetnih akterjih, ki se sklicuje tudi na razvoj razumevanja in utemeljevanja materinega jezika pri otrocih, ter predvideva večfazno utemeljevanje, se pravi utemeljevanje kompleksnejših simbolov v že utemeljenih, enostavnejših simbolih. V končnem delu naloge poskušamo pokazati, da lahko takšen mehanizem utemeljevanja simbolov privede do razumevanja izbranih pragmatičnih sredstev: govornih dejanj, metafor in metonimij. V ta namen pregledamo sodobno teorijo govornih dejanj in človeško razumevanje metafor in metonimij. Pokažemo tudi, da so nižja sredstva, s pomočjo katerih lahko umetni akter razume pragmatično izražanje bodisi slovnična ali sintaktična, torej so lahko vnaprej vsebovana v umetnem akterju, ali pa semantično monosemijska, kar pomeni, da jih lahko akter utemelji enoznačno brez semantičnih dvoumnosti.
Ključne besede: Utemeljevanje simbolov, umetna inteligenca, semiotika, semantika, pragmatika, umetno učenje, reprezentacionalizem, utelešena teorija, utemeljevanja pragmatike, govorna dejanja, metafora, metonimija, monosemija
Objavljeno v DKUM: 16.09.2020; Ogledov: 721; Prenosov: 73
.pdf Celotno besedilo (401,33 KB)

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