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1.
Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation
Chunyan Zhang, Jianlei Zhang, Franz Weissing, Matjaž Perc, Guangming Xie, Long Wang, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, phase transitions, social dilemmas, coevolution, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 19.06.2017; Ogledov: 417; Prenosov: 177
.pdf Celotno besedilo (481,90 KB)
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2.
Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Chunyan Zhang, Jianlei Zhang, Guangming Xie, Long Wang, Matjaž Perc, 2011, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the "making of new friends" may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.
Ključne besede: evolutionary games, prisoner's dilemma, coevolution, complex networks, friendship
Objavljeno: 19.06.2017; Ogledov: 203; Prenosov: 173
.pdf Celotno besedilo (309,95 KB)
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3.
Resolution of the stochastic strategy spatial prisoner's dilemma by means of particle swarm optimization
Jianlei Zhang, Chunyan Zhang, Tianguang Chu, Matjaž Perc, 2011, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals in the stochastic strategy spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We equip players with the particle swarm optimization technique, and find that it may lead to highly cooperative states even if the temptations to defect are strong. The concept of particle swarm optimization was originally introduced within a simple model of social dynamics that can describe the formation of a swarm, i.e., analogous to a swarm of bees searching for a food source. Essentially, particle swarm optimization foresees changes in the velocity profile of each player, such that the best locations are targeted and eventually occupied. In our case, each player keeps track of the highest payoff attained within a local topological neighborhood and its individual highest payoff. Thus, players make use of their own memory that keeps score of the most profitable strategy in previous actions, as well as use of the knowledge gained by the swarm as a whole, to find the best available strategy for themselves and the society. Following extensive simulations of this setup, we find a significant increase in the level of cooperation for a wide range of parameters, and also a full resolution of the prisoner's dilemma. We also demonstrate extreme efficiency of the optimization algorithm when dealing with environments that strongly favor the proliferation of defection, which in turn suggests that swarming could be an important phenomenon by means of which cooperation can be sustained even under highly unfavorable conditions. We thus present an alternative way of understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior and its ubiquitous presence in nature, and we hope that this study will be inspirational for future efforts aimed in this direction.
Ključne besede: cooperation, prisoner's dilemma, particle swarm optimization, stochastic strategies
Objavljeno: 19.06.2017; Ogledov: 360; Prenosov: 165
.pdf Celotno besedilo (627,24 KB)
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