| | SLO | ENG | Piškotki in zasebnost

Večja pisava | Manjša pisava

Iskanje po katalogu digitalne knjižnice Pomoč

Iskalni niz: išči po
išči po
išči po
išči po
* po starem in bolonjskem študiju


1 - 6 / 6
Na začetekNa prejšnjo stran1Na naslednjo stranNa konec
What is it worth? : Determining the capital stock of european hydropower plants
Petra Gsodam, Heinrich Stigler, objavljeni znanstveni prispevek na konferenci

Opis: High lifetimes and high capital intensities characterize fixed assets of electric utilities. The historical cost concept implicate that long-lasting fixed assets are shown too low in balance sheets of electric utilities: the real value of long-lasting assets is not shown because of nominal price increases. An alternative to show the real value of longterm assets represents the capital stock concept based on replacement values less depreciations (net capital stock). To calculate the capital stock, information regarding the level of investment in each power plant at the time of construction (historical acquisition values) and with regard to a common base year (replacement values) is necessary. This paper shows how the not-standardized investments in hydropower plants can be estimated and how the capital stock of run-of-river and threshold hydropower plants can be calculated. Long-term assets in the form of run-of-river and threshold hydropower plants are compared based on historic costs and replacement values. The paper concludes that given nominal price increases for replacement investments, as is the case with long-lasting hydropower plants, only depreciations based on replacement values can ensure preservation of the company’s assets.
Ključne besede: fixed assets, electric utilities, balance sheet, capital stock, depreciation
Objavljeno v DKUM: 11.10.2017; Ogledov: 933; Prenosov: 189
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,51 MB)

Stability of cooperation under image scoring in group interactions
Heinrich H. Nax, Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, Dirk Helbing, 2015, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Image scoring sustains cooperation in the repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma through indirect reciprocity, even though defection is the uniquely dominant selfish behaviour in the one-shot game. Many real-world dilemma situations, however, firstly, take place in groups and, secondly, lack the necessary transparency to inform subjects reliably of others' individual past actions. Instead, there is revelation of information regarding groups, which allows for "group scoring" but not for image scoring. Here, we study how sensitive the positive results related to image scoring are to information based on group scoring. We combine analytic results and computer simulations to specify the conditions for the emergence of cooperation. We show that under pure group scoring, that is, under the complete absence of image-scoring information, cooperation is unsustainable. Away from this extreme case, however, the necessary degree of image scoring relative to group scoring depends on the population size and is generally very small. We thus conclude that the positive results based on image scoring apply to a much broader range of informational settings that are relevant in the real world than previously assumed.
Ključne besede: public goods, group interactions, phase transition, social dilemma, physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 1102; Prenosov: 419
.pdf Celotno besedilo (329,32 KB)
Gradivo ima več datotek! Več...

Directional learning and the provisioning of public goods
Heinrich H. Nax, Matjaž Perc, 2015, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack strategically relevant information about the game and about the other players in the population. The resulting behavior of players is completely uncoupled from such information, and the individual strategy adjustment dynamics are driven only by reinforcement feedbacks from each player's own past. We show that the resulting "directional learning" is sufficient to explain cooperative deviations away from the Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of k-strong equilibria, which nest both the Nash equilibrium and the Aumann-strong equilibrium as two special cases, and we show that, together with the parameters of the learning model, the maximal k-strength of equilibrium determines the stationary distribution. The provisioning of public goods can be secured even under adverse conditions, as long as players are sufficiently responsive to the changes in their own payoffs and adjust their actions accordingly. Substantial levels of public cooperation can thus be explained without arguments involving selflessness or social preferences, solely on the basis of uncoordinated directional (mis)learning.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, directional learning, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 699; Prenosov: 305
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,40 MB)
Gradivo ima več datotek! Več...

Iskanje izvedeno v 0.12 sek.
Na vrh
Logotipi partnerjev Univerza v Mariboru Univerza v Ljubljani Univerza na Primorskem Univerza v Novi Gorici