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1.
Effects of adaptive degrees of trust on coevolution of quantum strategies on scale-free networks
Qiang Li, Minyou Chen, Matjaž Perc, Azhar Iqbal, Derek Abbott, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study the impact of adaptive degrees of trust on the evolution of cooperation in the quantum prisoner's dilemma game. In addition to the strategies, links between players are also subject to evolution. Starting with a scale-free interaction network, players adjust trust towards their neighbors based on received payoffs. The latter governs the strategy adoption process, while trust governs the rewiring of links. As soon as the degree of trust towards a neighbor drops to zero, the link is rewired to another randomly chosen player within the network. We find that for small temptations to defect cooperators always dominate, while for intermediate and strong temptations a single quantum strategy is able to outperform all other strategies. In general, reciprocal trust remains within close relationships and favors the dominance of a single strategy. Due to coevolution, the power-law degree distributions transform to Poisson distributions.
Ključne besede: evolutionary games, quantum strategies, coevolution, random networks, cooperation, statistical physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 864; Prenosov: 351
.pdf Celotno besedilo (669,03 KB)
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2.
Coevolution of quantum and classical strategies on evolving random networks
Qiang Li, Azhar Iqbal, Matjaž Perc, Minyou Chen, Derek Abbott, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study the coevolution of quantum and classical strategies on weighted and directed random networks in the realm of the prisoners dilemma game. During the evolution, agents can break and rewire their links with the aim of maximizing payoffs, and they can also adjust the weights to indicate preferences, either positive or negative, towards their neighbors. The network structure itself is thus also subject to evolution. Importantly, the directionality of links does not affect the accumulation of payoffs nor the strategy transfers, but serves only to designate the owner of each particular link and with it the right to adjust the link as needed. We show that quantum strategies outperform classical strategies, and that the critical temptation to defect at which cooperative behavior can be maintained rises, if the network structure is updated frequently. Punishing neighbors by reducing the weights of their links also plays an important role in maintaining cooperation under adverse conditions. We find that the self-organization of the initially random network structure, driven by the evolutionary competition between quantum and classical strategies, leads to the spontaneous emergence of small average path length and a large clustering coefficient.
Ključne besede: evolutionary games, quantum strategies, coevolution, random networks, cooperation
Objavljeno v DKUM: 19.06.2017; Ogledov: 997; Prenosov: 346
.pdf Celotno besedilo (803,96 KB)
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