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1.
Noise-guided evolution within cyclical interactions
Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, 2007, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study a stochastic predator-prey model on a square lattice, where each of the six species has two superior and two inferior partners. The invasion probabilities between species depend on the predator-prey pair and are supplemented by Gaussian noise. Conditions are identified that warrant the largest impact of noise on the evolutionary process, and the results of Monte Carlo simulations are qualitatively reproduced by a four-point cluster dynamical mean-field approximation. The observed noise-guided evolution is deeply routed in short-range spatial correlations, which is supported by simulations on other host lattice topologies. Our findings are conceptually related to the coherence resonance phenomenon in dynamical systems via the mechanism of threshold duality. We also show that the introduced concept of noise-guided evolution via the exploitation of threshold duality is not limited to predator-prey cyclical interactions, but may apply to models of evolutionary game theory as well, thus indicating its applicability in several different fields of research.
Ključne besede: dynamic systems, stochastic processes, cyclical interactions, evolutionary rules, flow simulations, Monte Carlo simulations
Objavljeno: 07.06.2012; Ogledov: 1100; Prenosov: 185
.pdf Celotno besedilo (573,61 KB)
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2.
Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions
Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, György Szabó, 2010, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This contribution addresses a number of related puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical approach as it has been successfully used to explain the behavior of other biological species many times, from bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes individuals applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative individuals ('defectors'), cooperative individuals abstaining from punishment efforts (called 'cooperators' or 'second-order free-riders'), cooperators who punish non-cooperative behavior ('moralists'), and defectors, who punish otherdefectors despite being non-cooperative themselves ('immoralists'). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segregation of behavioral strategies and solves the 'second-order free-rider problem'. Second, the system behavior changes its character significantly even after very long times ('who laughs last laughs best effect'). Third, the presence of a number of defectors can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing cooperators. Fourth, in order to succeed, moralists may profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an 'unholy collaboration'. Our findings suggest that the consideration of punishment strategies allows one to understand the establishment and spreading of 'moral behavior' by means of game-theoretical concepts. This demonstrates that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains that have been addressed with non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors become understandable as the result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, social dilemmas, spatial games, moral, cooperation
Objavljeno: 16.06.2017; Ogledov: 349; Prenosov: 189
.pdf Celotno besedilo (949,75 KB)
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3.
If cooperation is likely punish mildly: insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game
Luo-Luo Jiang, Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.
Ključne besede: public goods, punishment, economic experiments, snowdrift game
Objavljeno: 19.06.2017; Ogledov: 296; Prenosov: 179
.pdf Celotno besedilo (522,94 KB)
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4.
Vortices determine the dynamics of biodiversity in cyclical interactions with protection spillovers
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2015, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: If rock beats scissors and scissors beat paper, one might assume that rock beats paper too. But this is not the case for intransitive relationships that make up the famous rock-paper-scissors game. However, the sole presence of paper might prevent rock from beating scissors, simply because paper beats rock. This is the blueprint for the rock-paper-scissors game with protection spillovers, which has recently been introduced as a new paradigm for biodiversity in well-mixed microbial populations. Here we study the game in structured populations, demonstrating that protection spillovers give rise to spatial patterns that are impossible to observe in the classical rock-paper-scissors game.Weshow that the spatiotemporal dynamics of the system is determined by the density of stable vortices, which may ultimately transform to frozen states, to propagating waves, or to target waves with reversed propagation direction, depending further on the degree and type of randomness in the interactions among the species. If vortices are rare, the fixation to waves and complex oscillatory solutions is likelier. Moreover, annealed randomness in interactions favors the emergence of target waves, while quenched randomness favors collective synchronization. Our results demonstrate that protection spillovers may fundamentally change the dynamics of cyclic dominance in structured populations, and they outline the possibility of programming pattern formation in microbial populations.
Ključne besede: cyclical interactions, pattern formation, vortices, phase transitions, selforganization, biodiversity
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 245; Prenosov: 184
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,32 MB)
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5.
Biodiversity in models of cyclic dominance is preserved by heterogeneity in site-specific invasion rates
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2016, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Global, population-wide oscillations in models of cyclic dominance may result in the collapse of biodiversity due to the accidental extinction of one species in the loop. Previous research has shown that such oscillations can emerge if the interaction network has small-world properties, and more generally, because of long-range interactions among individuals or because of mobility. But although these features are all common in nature, global oscillations are rarely observed in actual biological systems. This begets the question what is the missing ingredient that would prevent local oscillations to synchronize across the population to form global oscillations. Here we show that, although heterogeneous species-specific invasion rates fail to have a noticeable impact on species coexistence, randomness in site-specific invasion rates successfully hinders the emergence of global oscillations and thus preserves biodiversity. Our model takes into account that the environment is often not uniform but rather spatially heterogeneous, which may influence the success of microscopic dynamics locally. This prevents the synchronization of locally emerging oscillations, and ultimately results in a phenomenon where one type of randomness is used to mitigate the adverse effects of other types of randomness in the system.
Ključne besede: biodiversity, cyclic dominance, rock-paper-scissors, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 218; Prenosov: 145
.pdf Celotno besedilo (419,58 KB)
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6.
Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner%s dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortion regardless of game parametrization, myopic updating gives rise to the coexistence of all five strategies if the temptation to defect is sufficiently large or if the degree distribution of the interaction network is heterogeneous. This counterintuitive evolutionary outcome emerges as a result of an unexpected chain of strategy invasions. Firstly, defectors emerge and coarsen spontaneously among players adopting win-stay-lose-shift. Secondly, extortioners and players adopting tit-for-tat emerge and spread via neutral drift among the emerged defectors. And lastly, among the extortioners, cooperators become viable too. These recurrent evolutionary invasions yield a five-strategy phase that is stable irrespective of the system size and the structure of the interaction network, and they reveal the most unexpected mechanism that stabilizes extortion and cooperation in an evolutionary setting.
Ključne besede: social dilemma, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 213; Prenosov: 161
.pdf Celotno besedilo (995,18 KB)
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7.
If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation
Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Spatial reciprocity is a well known tour de force of cooperation promotion. A thorough understanding of the effects of different population densities is therefore crucial. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas on different interaction graphs with a certain fraction of vacant nodes. We find that sparsity may favor the resolution of social dilemmas, especially if the population density is close to the percolation threshold of the underlying graph. Regardless of the type of the governing social dilemma as well as particularities of the interaction graph, we show that under pairwise imitation the percolation threshold is a universal indicator of how dense the occupancy ought to be for cooperation to be optimally promoted. We also demonstrate that myopic updating, due to the lack of efficient spread of information via imitation, renders the reported mechanism dysfunctional, which in turn further strengthens its foundations.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, punishment, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 295; Prenosov: 154
.pdf Celotno besedilo (413,53 KB)
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8.
Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games
Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines how payoffs on both networks jointly influence the success of players in each individual network. We show that an unbiased coupling allows the spontaneous emergence of interdependent network reciprocity, which is capable to maintain healthy levels of public cooperation even in extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however, requires simultaneous formation of correlated cooperator clusters on both networks. If this does not emerge or if the coordination process is disturbed, network reciprocity fails, resulting in the total collapse of cooperation. Network interdependence can thus be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, but only if the coordination between the interdependent networks is not disturbed.
Ključne besede: social dilemma, cooperation, public goods, biased utility, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 305; Prenosov: 165
.pdf Celotno besedilo (741,04 KB)
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9.
Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2016, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the most profitable strategy within the interaction range. Such conformity might be due to herding instincts or crowd behavior in humans and social animals. In a heterogeneous population where individuals differ in their degree, collective influence, or other traits, an unanswered question remains who should conform. Selecting conformists randomly is the simplest choice, but it is neither a realistic nor the optimal one. We show that, regardless of the source of heterogeneity and game parametrization, socially the most favorable outcomes emerge if the masses conform. On the other hand, forcing leaders to conform significantly hinders the constructive interplay between heterogeneity and coordination, leading to evolutionary outcomes that are worse still than if conformists were chosen randomly. We conclude that leaders must be able to create a following for network reciprocity to be optimally augmented by conformity. In the opposite case, when leaders are castrated and made to follow, the failure of coordination impairs the evolution of cooperation.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, selection, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 192; Prenosov: 173
.pdf Celotno besedilo (620,37 KB)
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10.
Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation
Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality.
Ključne besede: social dilemma, cooperation, public goods, biased utility, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 305; Prenosov: 174
.pdf Celotno besedilo (658,72 KB)
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