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1.
Time delays shape the eco‑evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
Sourav Roy, Sayantan Nag Chowdhury, Srilena Kundu, Gourab Kumar Sar, Jeet Banerjee, Biswambhar Rakshit, Prakash Chandra Mali, Matjaž Perc, Dibakar Ghosh, 2023, original scientific article

Abstract: We study the intricate interplay between ecological and evolutionary processes through the lens of the prisoner’s dilemma game. But while previous studies on cooperation amongst selfsh individuals often assume instantaneous interactions, we take into consideration delays to investigate how these might afect the causes underlying prosocial behavior. Through analytical calculations and numerical simulations, we demonstrate that delays can lead to oscillations, and by incorporating also the ecological variable of altruistic free space and the evolutionary strategy of punishment, we explore how these factors impact population and community dynamics. Depending on the parameter values and the initial fraction of each strategy, the studied eco-evolutionary model can mimic a cyclic dominance system and even exhibit chaotic behavior, thereby highlighting the importance of complex dynamics for the efective management and conservation of ecological communities. Our research thus contributes to the broader understanding of group decision-making and the emergence of moral behavior in multidimensional social systems.
Keywords: cooperation, time delay, evolutionary dynamics, social dilemma, social physics
Published in DKUM: 04.04.2024; Views: 41; Downloads: 0
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2.
Information sharing promotes prosocial behaviour
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, original scientific article

Abstract: More often than not, bad decisions are bad regardless of where and when they are made. Information sharing might thus be utilized to mitigate them. Here we show that sharing information about strategy choice between players residing on two different networks reinforces the evolution of cooperation. In evolutionary games, the strategy reflects the action of each individual that warrants the highest utility in a competitive setting. We therefore assume that identical strategies on the two networks reinforce themselves by lessening their propensity to change. Besides network reciprocity working in favour of cooperation on each individual network, we observe the spontaneous emergence of correlated behaviour between the two networks, which further deters defection. If information is shared not just between individuals but also between groups, the positive effect is even stronger, and this despite the fact that information sharing is implemented without any assumptions with regard to content.
Keywords: cooperation, information, social dilemma, public goods, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems
Published in DKUM: 03.07.2017; Views: 1113; Downloads: 406
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3.
Evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks subject to error and attack
Matjaž Perc, 2009, original scientific article

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game on scale-free networks that are subjected to intentional and random removal of vertices. We show that, irrespective of the game type, cooperation on scale-free networks is extremely robust against random deletionof vertices, but declines quickly if vertices with the maximal degree are targeted. In particular, attack tolerance is lowest if the temptation to defect is largest, whereby a small fraction of removed vertices suffices to decimate cooperators. The decline of cooperation can be directly linked to the decrease of heterogeneity of scale-free networks that sets in due to the removal of high degree vertices. We conclude that the evolution of cooperation is characterized by similar attack and error tolerance as was previously reported for information readiness and spread of viruses on scale-free networks.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, social dilemma, spatial games, complex networks
Published in DKUM: 30.06.2017; Views: 1467; Downloads: 354
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4.
Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner's dilemma game on coevolving random networks
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2009, original scientific article

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player adopts a new strategy or its degree exceeds a threshold value; second, new links are added randomly after a given number of game iterations. These coevolutionary processes correspond to the generic formation of new links and deletion of existing links that, especially in human societies, appear frequently as a consequence of ongoing socialization, change of lifestyle or death. Due to the counteraction of deletions and additions of links the initial heterogeneity of the interaction network is qualitatively preserved, and thus cannot be held responsible for the observed promotion of cooperation. Indeed, the coevolutionary rule evokes the spontaneous emergence of a powerful multilevel selection mechanism, which despite the sustained random topology of the evolving network, maintains cooperation across the whole span of defection temptation values.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma, spatial games, coevolution, social systems
Published in DKUM: 30.06.2017; Views: 1576; Downloads: 399
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5.
Stability of cooperation under image scoring in group interactions
Heinrich H. Nax, Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, Dirk Helbing, 2015, original scientific article

Abstract: Image scoring sustains cooperation in the repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma through indirect reciprocity, even though defection is the uniquely dominant selfish behaviour in the one-shot game. Many real-world dilemma situations, however, firstly, take place in groups and, secondly, lack the necessary transparency to inform subjects reliably of others' individual past actions. Instead, there is revelation of information regarding groups, which allows for "group scoring" but not for image scoring. Here, we study how sensitive the positive results related to image scoring are to information based on group scoring. We combine analytic results and computer simulations to specify the conditions for the emergence of cooperation. We show that under pure group scoring, that is, under the complete absence of image-scoring information, cooperation is unsustainable. Away from this extreme case, however, the necessary degree of image scoring relative to group scoring depends on the population size and is generally very small. We thus conclude that the positive results based on image scoring apply to a much broader range of informational settings that are relevant in the real world than previously assumed.
Keywords: public goods, group interactions, phase transition, social dilemma, physics of social systems
Published in DKUM: 23.06.2017; Views: 1388; Downloads: 444
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6.
Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups
Luo-Luo Jiang, Matjaž Perc, 2013, original scientific article

Abstract: Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoners dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance.
Keywords: social dilemma, cooperation, public goods, biased utility, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems
Published in DKUM: 23.06.2017; Views: 1622; Downloads: 409
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7.
Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation
Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, original scientific article

Abstract: Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality.
Keywords: social dilemma, cooperation, public goods, biased utility, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems
Published in DKUM: 23.06.2017; Views: 1108; Downloads: 373
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8.
Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games
Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, original scientific article

Abstract: Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines how payoffs on both networks jointly influence the success of players in each individual network. We show that an unbiased coupling allows the spontaneous emergence of interdependent network reciprocity, which is capable to maintain healthy levels of public cooperation even in extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however, requires simultaneous formation of correlated cooperator clusters on both networks. If this does not emerge or if the coordination process is disturbed, network reciprocity fails, resulting in the total collapse of cooperation. Network interdependence can thus be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, but only if the coordination between the interdependent networks is not disturbed.
Keywords: social dilemma, cooperation, public goods, biased utility, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems
Published in DKUM: 23.06.2017; Views: 1138; Downloads: 383
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9.
Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility
Xiaojie Chen, Matjaž Perc, 2014, original scientific article

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribute part of their endowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all players are lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the contributions of cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are preserved but never excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of common resources that initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Exceeding critical thresholds in either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to the depletion of common resources.
Keywords: social dilemma, evolutionary games, public goods, abundance, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Published in DKUM: 23.06.2017; Views: 1810; Downloads: 389
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10.
Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2014, original scientific article

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner%s dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortion regardless of game parametrization, myopic updating gives rise to the coexistence of all five strategies if the temptation to defect is sufficiently large or if the degree distribution of the interaction network is heterogeneous. This counterintuitive evolutionary outcome emerges as a result of an unexpected chain of strategy invasions. Firstly, defectors emerge and coarsen spontaneously among players adopting win-stay-lose-shift. Secondly, extortioners and players adopting tit-for-tat emerge and spread via neutral drift among the emerged defectors. And lastly, among the extortioners, cooperators become viable too. These recurrent evolutionary invasions yield a five-strategy phase that is stable irrespective of the system size and the structure of the interaction network, and they reveal the most unexpected mechanism that stabilizes extortion and cooperation in an evolutionary setting.
Keywords: social dilemma, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Published in DKUM: 23.06.2017; Views: 1018; Downloads: 375
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