1. Optimal governance and implementation of vaccination programmes to contain the COVID-19 pandemicMahendra Piraveenan, Shailendra Sawleshwarkar, Michael Walsh, Iryna Zablotska, Samit Bhattacharyya, Habib Hassan Farooqui, Tarun Bhatnagar, Anup Karan, Manoj Murhekar, Sanjay P. Zodpey, K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao, Philippa Pattison, Albert Y. Zomaya, Matjaž Perc, 2021, original scientific article Abstract: Since the recent introduction of several viable vaccines for SARS-CoV-2, vaccination uptake has become the key factor that will determine our success in containing the COVID-19 pandemic. We argue that game theory and social network models should be used to guide decisions pertaining to vaccination programmes for the best possible results. In the months following the introduction of vaccines, their availability and the human resources needed to run the vaccination programmes have been scarce in many countries. Vaccine hesitancy is also being encountered from some sections of the general public. We emphasize that decision-making under uncertainty and imperfect information, and with only conditionally optimal outcomes, is a unique forte of established game-theoretic modelling. Therefore, we can use this approach to obtain the best framework for modelling and simulating vaccination prioritization and uptake that will be readily available to inform important policy decisions for the optimal control of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Keywords: COVID-19, evolutionary game theory, digital epidemiology, vaccination, social network, public goods game, social physics
Published in DKUM: 28.02.2025; Views: 0; Downloads: 3
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2. The dynamics of a duopoly Stackelberg game with marginal costs among heterogeneous playersAtefeh Ahmadi, Sourav Roy, Mahtab Mehrabbeik, Dibakar Ghosh, Sajad Jafari, Matjaž Perc, 2023, original scientific article Abstract: One of the famous economic models in game theory is the duopoly Stackelberg model, in which a leader and a follower firm manufacture a single product in the market. Their goal is to obtain the maximum profit while competing with each other. The desired dynamics for a firm in a market is the convergence to its Nash equilibrium, but the dynamics of real-world markets are not always steady and can result in unpredictable market changes that exhibit chaotic behaviors. On the other hand, to approach reality more, the two firms in the market can be considered heterogeneous. The leader firm is bounded rationale, and the follower firm is adaptable. Modifying the cost function that affects the firms' profit by adding the marginal cost term is another step toward reality. We propose a Stackelberg model with heterogeneous players and marginal costs, which exhibits chaotic behavior. This model's equilibrium points, including the Nash equilibrium, are calculated by the backward induction method, and their stability analyses are obtained. The influence of changing each model parameter on the consequent dynamics is investigated through one-dimensional and two-dimensional bifurcation diagrams, Lyapunov exponents spectra, and Kaplan-Yorke dimension. Eventually, using a combination of state feedback and parameter adjustment methods, the chaotic solutions of the model are successfully tamed, and the model converges to its Nash equilibrium.
Keywords: nonlinear dynamics, game theory, stability analysis, public goods
Published in DKUM: 02.08.2023; Views: 459; Downloads: 49
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3. Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods gameDirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, György Szabó, 2010, original scientific article Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers,increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishing strategies can spread in both cases, but based on largely different mechanisms, which depend on the cooperativeness (or not) of punishers.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, public goods, spatial games, punishment, social systems, moral
Published in DKUM: 03.07.2017; Views: 1855; Downloads: 409
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4. Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods gameAttila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2016, original scientific article Abstract: Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, tolerant players are also present. Depending on the number of defectors within a group, a tolerant player can either cooperate in or abstain from a particular instance of the game.Weshow that the diversity of tolerance can give rise to synergistic effects, wherein players with a different threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in a group compete most effectively against defection and default abstinence. Such synergistic associations can stabilise states of full cooperation where otherwise defection would dominate.Weobserve complex pattern formation that gives rise to an intricate phase diagram, where invisible yet stable strategy alliances require outmost care lest they are overlooked. Our results highlight the delicate importance of diversity and tolerance for the provisioning of public goods, and they reveal fascinating subtleties of the spatiotemporal dynamics that is due to the competition of subsystem solutions in structured populations.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, public goods game, human cooperation
Published in DKUM: 30.06.2017; Views: 1332; Downloads: 423
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5. If cooperation is likely punish mildly: insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift gameLuo-Luo Jiang, Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, 2013, original scientific article Abstract: Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.
Keywords: public goods, punishment, economic experiments, snowdrift game
Published in DKUM: 19.06.2017; Views: 1200; Downloads: 409
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6. Microeconomics : an integrated approachDavid Besanko, Ronald Ray Braeutigam, higher education textbook Keywords: microeconomics, economic analyses, problematics, problem solving, theory of rational expectations, supply, demand, general equilibrium, consumer, opportunities, mathematical economy, input-output, costs, minimization, competitiveness, competitive advantage, market, application, monopolies, oligopolies, game theory, behavior, market structure, risk, informations, externalities, public goods, graphic methods, graph theory, textbooks, exercises, manuals
Published in DKUM: 01.06.2012; Views: 2943; Downloads: 56
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