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1.
A game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance
Yinhai Fang, Matjaž Perc, Hui Zhang, 2022, original scientific article

Abstract: Digital technologies provide a convenient way for the public to participate in environmental governance. Therefore, by means of a two-stage evolutionary model, a new mechanism for promoting public cooperation is proposed to accomplish environmental collaborative governance. Interactive effects of government-enterprise environmental governance are firstly explored, which is the external atmosphere for public behaviour. Second, the evolutionary dynamics of public behaviour is analysed to reveal the internal mechanism of the emergence of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance projects. Simulations reveal that the interaction of resource elements between government and enterprise is an important basis for environmental governance performance, and that governments can improve this as well as public cooperation by increasing the marginal governance propensity. Similarly, an increase in the government's fixed expenditure item of environmental governance can also significantly improve government-enterprise performance and public cooperation. And finally, the effect of government's marginal incentive propensity on public environmental governance is moderated by enterprises' marginal environmental governance propensity, so that simply increasing the government's marginal incentive propensity cannot improve the evolutionary stable state of public behaviour under the scenario where enterprises’ marginal environmental governance propensity is low.
Keywords: game theory, human behaviour, cooperation, mathematical model, common goods
Published in DKUM: 28.05.2024; Views: 133; Downloads: 0

2.
Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2016, original scientific article

Abstract: Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, tolerant players are also present. Depending on the number of defectors within a group, a tolerant player can either cooperate in or abstain from a particular instance of the game.Weshow that the diversity of tolerance can give rise to synergistic effects, wherein players with a different threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in a group compete most effectively against defection and default abstinence. Such synergistic associations can stabilise states of full cooperation where otherwise defection would dominate.Weobserve complex pattern formation that gives rise to an intricate phase diagram, where invisible yet stable strategy alliances require outmost care lest they are overlooked. Our results highlight the delicate importance of diversity and tolerance for the provisioning of public goods, and they reveal fascinating subtleties of the spatiotemporal dynamics that is due to the competition of subsystem solutions in structured populations.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, public goods game, human cooperation
Published in DKUM: 30.06.2017; Views: 1231; Downloads: 392
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