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Technological valley of death as an emergent evolutionary phenomenon
Petra Fic, 2019, master's thesis

Abstract: Perceptual researchers often argue that natural selection supports veridical perceptions, respectively those that accurately reflect the environment. They also claim that beings whose perceptions are truer are also more fit. This assumption was tested using standard tools of evolutionary game theory in a simple environment. The result was that more veridical perceptions are not necessarily more successful. In the majority of the parameter space, veridical perceptions are extinct in competition with simplified perceptions, based on adaptive behavior in a given environment. In the thesis, we build upon mentioned territorial games introduced by Mark, Marion, and Hoffman in 2010, and extend four of their territory perception and selection strategies with two novel ones that together constitute a model of technological readiness valley of death. Whenever utility of a resource is not monotonous in the amount of that resource, the technological valley of death emerges. While the development of the science behind these models is in its infancy, modeling and understanding the phenomenon may shed light on progress and related phenomena in society.
Keywords: evolution, perception, utility, Monte Carlo simulation, game theory
Published: 22.11.2019; Views: 518; Downloads: 75
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Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, György Szabó, 2010, original scientific article

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers,increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishing strategies can spread in both cases, but based on largely different mechanisms, which depend on the cooperativeness (or not) of punishers.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, public goods, spatial games, punishment, social systems, moral
Published: 03.07.2017; Views: 805; Downloads: 305
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Evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks subject to error and attack
Matjaž Perc, 2009, original scientific article

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game on scale-free networks that are subjected to intentional and random removal of vertices. We show that, irrespective of the game type, cooperation on scale-free networks is extremely robust against random deletionof vertices, but declines quickly if vertices with the maximal degree are targeted. In particular, attack tolerance is lowest if the temptation to defect is largest, whereby a small fraction of removed vertices suffices to decimate cooperators. The decline of cooperation can be directly linked to the decrease of heterogeneity of scale-free networks that sets in due to the removal of high degree vertices. We conclude that the evolution of cooperation is characterized by similar attack and error tolerance as was previously reported for information readiness and spread of viruses on scale-free networks.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, social dilemma, spatial games, complex networks
Published: 30.06.2017; Views: 928; Downloads: 281
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Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner's dilemma game on coevolving random networks
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2009, original scientific article

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player adopts a new strategy or its degree exceeds a threshold value; second, new links are added randomly after a given number of game iterations. These coevolutionary processes correspond to the generic formation of new links and deletion of existing links that, especially in human societies, appear frequently as a consequence of ongoing socialization, change of lifestyle or death. Due to the counteraction of deletions and additions of links the initial heterogeneity of the interaction network is qualitatively preserved, and thus cannot be held responsible for the observed promotion of cooperation. Indeed, the coevolutionary rule evokes the spontaneous emergence of a powerful multilevel selection mechanism, which despite the sustained random topology of the evolving network, maintains cooperation across the whole span of defection temptation values.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma, spatial games, coevolution, social systems
Published: 30.06.2017; Views: 930; Downloads: 329
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Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2016, original scientific article

Abstract: Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, tolerant players are also present. Depending on the number of defectors within a group, a tolerant player can either cooperate in or abstain from a particular instance of the game.Weshow that the diversity of tolerance can give rise to synergistic effects, wherein players with a different threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in a group compete most effectively against defection and default abstinence. Such synergistic associations can stabilise states of full cooperation where otherwise defection would dominate.Weobserve complex pattern formation that gives rise to an intricate phase diagram, where invisible yet stable strategy alliances require outmost care lest they are overlooked. Our results highlight the delicate importance of diversity and tolerance for the provisioning of public goods, and they reveal fascinating subtleties of the spatiotemporal dynamics that is due to the competition of subsystem solutions in structured populations.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, public goods game, human cooperation
Published: 30.06.2017; Views: 742; Downloads: 304
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Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2008, original scientific article

Abstract: Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied by an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment, this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma, spatial games, snowdrift game, coevolution
Published: 30.06.2017; Views: 630; Downloads: 374
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Heterogeneous aspirations promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
Matjaž Perc, Zhen Wang, 2010, original scientific article

Abstract: To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the strategies of better performing players in the hopeof successful reproduction. In structured populations the array of those that are eligible to act as strategy sources is bounded to the immediate neighbors of each individual. But which one of these strategy sources should potentially be copied? Previous research dealt with this question either by selecting the fittest or by selecting one player uniformly at random. Here we introduce a parameter that interpolates between these two extreme options. Setting equal to zero returns the random selection of the opponent, while positive favor the fitter players. In addition, we divide the population intotwo groups. Players from group select their opponents as dictated by the parameter , while players from group do so randomly irrespective of . We denote the fraction of players contained in groups and by and , respectively. The two parameters and allow us to analyze in detail how aspirations in the context of the prisoner's dilemma game influence the evolution of cooperation. We find that for sufficiently positive values of there exist a robust intermediate for which cooperation thrives best. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different interaction networks. We also provide complete phase diagrams depicting the dependence of the impact of and for different values of , and contrast the validity of ourconclusions by means of an alternative model where individual aspiration levels are subject to evolution as well. Our study indicates that heterogeneity in aspirations may be key for the sustainability of cooperation in structured populations.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma, spatial games, aspirations, social systems, physics and society
Published: 19.06.2017; Views: 779; Downloads: 308
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Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions
Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, György Szabó, 2010, original scientific article

Abstract: Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This contribution addresses a number of related puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical approach as it has been successfully used to explain the behavior of other biological species many times, from bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes individuals applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative individuals ('defectors'), cooperative individuals abstaining from punishment efforts (called 'cooperators' or 'second-order free-riders'), cooperators who punish non-cooperative behavior ('moralists'), and defectors, who punish otherdefectors despite being non-cooperative themselves ('immoralists'). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segregation of behavioral strategies and solves the 'second-order free-rider problem'. Second, the system behavior changes its character significantly even after very long times ('who laughs last laughs best effect'). Third, the presence of a number of defectors can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing cooperators. Fourth, in order to succeed, moralists may profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an 'unholy collaboration'. Our findings suggest that the consideration of punishment strategies allows one to understand the establishment and spreading of 'moral behavior' by means of game-theoretical concepts. This demonstrates that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains that have been addressed with non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors become understandable as the result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, social dilemmas, spatial games, moral, cooperation
Published: 16.06.2017; Views: 694; Downloads: 334
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Domination game: extremal families of graphs for 3/5-conjectures
Boštjan Brešar, Sandi Klavžar, Gašper Košmrlj, Douglas F. Rall, 2013, original scientific article

Abstract: Igralca, Dominator in Zavlačevalka, izmenoma izbirata vozlišča grafa ▫$G$▫, takoda vsako izbrano vozlišče poveča množico do sedaj dominiranih vozlišč. Cilj Dominatorja je končati igro čim hitreje, medtem ko je Zavlačevalkin cilj ravno nasprotno. Igralno dominacijsko število ▫$gamma_g(G)$▫ je skupno število izbranih vozlišč v igri, ko Dominator naredi prvo potezo in oba igralca igrata optimalno. Postavljena je bila domneva [W.B. Kinnersley, D.B. West, R. Zemani, Extremal problems for game domination number, Manuscript, 2012], da velja ▫$gamma_g(G) leq frac{3|V(G)|}{5}$▫ za poljuben graf ▫$G$▫ brez izoliranih vozlišč. V posebnem je domneva odprta tudi, ko je ▫$G$▫ gozd. V tem članku predstavimo konstrukcije, ki nam dajo velike družine dreves, ki dosežejo domnevno mejo ▫$3/5$▫. Leplenje dreves iz nekaterih izmed teh družin napoljuben graf nam da konstrukcijo grafov ▫$G$▫, ki imajo igralno dominacijsko število enako ▫$3|V(G)|/5$▫. Z računalnikom smo poiskali vsa ekstremna drevesa znajveč 20 vozlišči. V posebnem, na 20 vozliščih obstaja natanko deset dreves ▫$T$▫, za katere velja ▫$gamma_g(T) = 12$▫, in vsa pripadajo skonstruiranim družinam.
Keywords: matematika, teorija grafov, dominacijska igra, igralno dominacijsko številko, 3/5-domneva, računalniško iskanje, mathematics, graph theory, domination game, game domination number, 3/5-conjecture, computer search
Published: 10.07.2015; Views: 813; Downloads: 74
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Domination game played on trees and spanning subgraphs
Boštjan Brešar, Sandi Klavžar, Douglas F. Rall, 2013, original scientific article

Abstract: Igra dominacije na grafu ▫$G$▫ je bila vpeljana v [B. Brešar, S. Klavžar, D. F. Rall, Domination game and an imagination strategy, SIAM J. Discrete Math. 24 (2010) 979-991]. Dva igralca, Dominator in Zavlačevalec, drug za drugim izbirata po eno vozlišče grafa. Vsako izbrano vozlišče mora povečati množico vozlišč, ki so bila dominirana do tega trenutka igre. Oba igralca izbirata optimalno strategijo, pri čemer Dominator želi igro končati v najmanjšem možnem številu korakov, Zavlačevalec pa v največjem možnem številu korakov. Igralno dominacijsko število ▫$gamma_g(G)$▫ je število izbranih vozlišč v igri, kjer je Dominator prvi izbral vozlišče. Ustrezno invarianto, ko igro začne Zavlačevalec, označimo z ▫$gamma_g'(G)$▫. V članku sta obe igri proučevani na drevesih in vpetih podgrafih. Dokazana je spodnja meja za igralno dominacijsko število drevesa, ki je funkcija njegovega reda in maksimalne stopnje. Pokazano je, da je meja asimptotično optimalna. Dokazano je, da za vsak ▫$k$▫ obstaja drevo ▫$T$▫ z ▫$(gamma_g(T),gamma_g'(T)) = (k,k+1)$▫ in postavljena je domneva, da ne obstaja drevo z ▫$(gamma_g(T),gamma_g'(T)) = (k,k-1)$▫. Obravnavana je povezava med igralnim dominacijskim številom grafa in njegovimi vpetimi podgrafi. Dokazano je, da obstajajo 3-povezani grafi ▫$G$▫, ki vsebujejo 2-povezani vpeti podgraf ▫$H$▫, tako da je igralno dominacijsko število grafa ▫$H$▫ poljubno manjše od igralnega dominacijskega števila grafa ▫$G$▫. Podobno je dokazano, da za vsako celo število ▫$ell ge 1$▫ obstajata graf ▫$G$▫ in njegov vpeti podgraf $T$, tako da velja ▫$gamma_g(G)-gamma_g(T) ge ell$▫. Po drugi strani obstajajo grafi ▫$G$▫, za katere je igralno dominacijsko število vsakega vpetega drevesa v ▫$G$▫ poljubno večje od igralnega dominacijskega števila od ▫$G$▫.
Keywords: igra dominacije, igralno dominacijsko število, drevo, vpeti podgraf, graph theory, domination game, game domination number, tree, spanning subgraph
Published: 10.07.2015; Views: 805; Downloads: 75
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