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Abstract: In this paper, we explore the impact of four different types of dissimilarity-driven behavior on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game. While it is commonly assumed that individuals adapt their strategy by imitating one of their more successful neighbors, in reality only very few will be awarded the highest payoffs. Many have equity or equality preferences, and they have to make do with an average or even with a low payoff. To account for this, we divide the population into two categories. One consists of payoff-driven players, while the other consists of dissimilarity-driven players. The later imitate the minority strategy in their group based on four different dissimilaritydriven behaviors. The rule that most effectively promotes cooperation, and this regardless of the multiplication factor of the public goods game, is when individuals adopt the minority strategy only when their payoff is better than that of their neighbors. If the dissimilarity-driven players adopt the minority strategy regardless of the payoffs of others, or if their payoff is the same, the population typically evolves towards a neutral state where cooperators and defectors are equally common. This may be beneficial when the multiplication factor is low, when defectors would otherwise dominate. However, if the dissimilarity-driven players adopt the minority strategy only when their payoff is worse than that of their neighbors, then cooperation is not promoted at all in comparison to the baseline case in the absence of dissimilarity-driven behavior. We explore the pattern formation behind these results, and we discuss their wider implications for the better understanding of cooperative behavior in social groups.
Keywords: theoretical biology, evolution, agent-based modeling, complex system, network science, evolutionary game theory
Published in DKUM: 26.02.2025; Views: 0; Downloads: 3
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A game theoretical model for the stimulation of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance
Yinhai Fang, Matjaž Perc, Hui Zhang, 2022, original scientific article

Abstract: Digital technologies provide a convenient way for the public to participate in environmental governance. Therefore, by means of a two-stage evolutionary model, a new mechanism for promoting public cooperation is proposed to accomplish environmental collaborative governance. Interactive effects of government-enterprise environmental governance are firstly explored, which is the external atmosphere for public behaviour. Second, the evolutionary dynamics of public behaviour is analysed to reveal the internal mechanism of the emergence of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance projects. Simulations reveal that the interaction of resource elements between government and enterprise is an important basis for environmental governance performance, and that governments can improve this as well as public cooperation by increasing the marginal governance propensity. Similarly, an increase in the government's fixed expenditure item of environmental governance can also significantly improve government-enterprise performance and public cooperation. And finally, the effect of government's marginal incentive propensity on public environmental governance is moderated by enterprises' marginal environmental governance propensity, so that simply increasing the government's marginal incentive propensity cannot improve the evolutionary stable state of public behaviour under the scenario where enterprises’ marginal environmental governance propensity is low.
Keywords: game theory, human behaviour, cooperation, mathematical model, common goods
Published in DKUM: 28.05.2024; Views: 219; Downloads: 17
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