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Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement
Xiaojie Chen, Tatsuya Sasaki, Matjaž Perc, 2015, original scientific article

Abstract: Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordination game, thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However, although the group size in this context has nonlinear effects on collective action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate group size was declared optimal with the conjecture that group-size effects and within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical research thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human societies, and additionally, it reveals fundamental group-size effects that facilitate prosocial collective action.
Keywords: cooperation, public goods, punishment, sustainable development, physics of social systems
Published in DKUM: 23.06.2017; Views: 1185; Downloads: 413
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