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Naslov:Can concepts ground apriori knowledge? : Peacocke's referential turn and its challenges
Avtorji:ID Miščević, Nenad (Avtor)
Datoteke:URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0032-2
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Neznano
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FF - Filozofska fakulteta
Opis:The paper is a critical examination of Peacocke's pioneering work on concepts as grounding the possibility of a priori knowledge. It focuses upon his more recent turn to reference and referential domain, and the two enlargements of the purely conceptual bases for apriority, namely appeal to conceptions and to direct referential sensitivity. I argue that the two are needed, but they produce more problem for the strategy as a whole than they solve. I conclude by suggesting that they point to a possible Benacerraf-like dilemma for conceptualists accounts of armchair knowledge: if concepts are akin to representational contents and/or conceptions, they certainly do not metaphysically determine anything. At best, they fallibly guide our inquiry, and get corrected almost by each new important discovery about the nature of their referents. If what is meant by "concept" is a Fregean, objectively correct and metaphysically potent entity, there is little doubt in its power to determine its referent(s), but, there is a huge epistemic problem of how we grasp such Platonic concepts. Peacocke's early metaphysics of concept, which offered beginnings of an answer, is put in jeopardy by the new referential turn, and his valiant attempts to pass between the multiple horns of this dilemma seem to face a lot of difficulties.
Ključne besede:analytical philosophy, conceptualism, predeterminism, apriority, concepts
Leto izida:2008
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-35742 Novo okno
UDK:165
COBISS.SI-ID:16318984 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:0353-5150
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:S47IOTBZ
Datum objave v DKUM:07.06.2012
Število ogledov:2433
Število prenosov:117
Metapodatki:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
:
MIŠČEVIĆ, Nenad, 2008, Can concepts ground apriori knowledge? : Peacocke’s referential turn and its challenges. Acta analytica : philosophy and psychology [na spletu]. 2008. [Dostopano 10 april 2025]. Pridobljeno s: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0032-2
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:Acta analytica : philosophy and psychology
Skrajšan naslov:Acta anal.
Založnik:Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science
ISSN:0353-5150
COBISS.SI-ID:5886978 Novo okno

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Angleški jezik
Ključne besede:analitična filozofija, konceptualizem, predeterminiranost, koncepti, a priori, Peacocke


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